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10 June 1980

Japan Report

(FOUO 15/80)



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JAPAN REPORT

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JCP ANNOUNCES POLICY ON U.S. RELATIONS, CORRUPTION, OTHER ISSUES

OW071113 Tokyo JPS in English 0916 GMT 7 May 80

[Text] Tokyo May 7 JPS--Chairman of Diet Policy Committee, Zenmei Matsumoto, of the Japanese Communist Party on May 6 made known the JCP policy toward the following issues to be taken up in the last round of the Diet session.

On the Japan-U.S. summit talks--the responsibility of the Ohira government will be questioned for Premier Ohira's promises at the Japan-U.S. summit on Japan's cooperation in "sanctions" against Iran and on rearmaments. This questioning will be made in the plenary session of both houses to be held immediately after the premier returns home, and the meeting of the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Special Committee on Security.

On the question of plutocracy and corruption--the JCP will continue to demand that LDP Diet member Koichi Hamada should be convened to the Diet and the special committee on airplanes scandals should be held. The party will also demand that former postal minister Hattori should be summoned before the Diet as witness of the KDD scandal.

On the bill to revise adversely the health insurance--the Liberal Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Komei Party and the Democratic Socialist Party are planning to have the bill pass the Lower House Social and Labor Committee on May 7 and the house plenary session on May 8. The JCP, which is opposed to the bill, will demand a thorough discussion to reveal the aim of the bill at increasing the burden of the people for medical care.

On the bill to revise adversely the public offices election law--the LDP will probably present the bill to the current session of the Diet. The JCP will criticize the JSP for colluding with the LDP on this issue. To defend parliamentary democracy, the JCP will demand a thorough discussion, if these parties will attempt to have the bill pass the Diet without discussion, exploiting the confusion at the end of the current diet session.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

MITI OFFICIAL DEPLORES STATE OF ALLIANCE WITH U.S., JAPAN WARNED

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Mar 80 pp 218-236

[Article by Naohiro Amaya, MITI Deputy Minister for International Affairs]

[Text] U. S. Displeasure with Japan

A ministerial conference of the IEA [International Energy Agency] met in Paris on 10 December 1979; I accompanied MITI Minister Sasaki to that conference. It is not the purpose of this article to describe the conference in detail, but I think a brief reference to the background which led to the holding of the conference is a necessary step in reaching the main topic.

The second oil crisis triggered by Iran's suspension of oil production at the end of 1978 passed the critical phase, as far as macroeconomic market conditions were concerned, when Iran resumed oil production in March 1979 and other oil producing countries increased their production; after that a period of respite came about. Nevertheless, the consuming countries' sense of crisis regarding the condition of the oil market was not relieved in the least. The first reason for this is that the oil producing countries had adopted a policy of reducing the volumes supplied to the major oil companies and transferring that oil to what are called D-D or G-G transactions or to the spot market. Therefore the distribution process was disrupted and, even though macroeconomic supply and demand were more or less in balance, the imbalance in microeconomic supply and demand intensified throughout 1979. Receiving notification of supply cuts from the majors, many uneasy independent companies rushed to the spot market to ensure their supply. The tone of prices on the spot market was firm all through 1979--in mid-year and early autumn, especially, the market was in a near frenzy. The second reason for this sense of crisis was the incident in which U.S. embassy officials in Tehran were taken hostage in November 1979. Resolution of this problem has been difficult, and relations between the U.S. and Iran rapidly deteriorated to a very delicate situation. At the same time, a grave sense of danger developed in connection with the future of Iranian oil production and exports. This sort of uneasiness regarding the future stimulated a desire to hoard, and the increase of current purchases of oil to be hoarded stimulated the prices in the spot market. The third reason was that in addition to Iran,

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many other oil-producing countries like Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Venezuela and Indonesia expressed their intentions of cutting back on production plans. The fourth was that it was not clear whether Saudi Arabia's provisional production level of 9.5 million barrels would be maintained in 1980.

For these reasons the spot market became tighter and tighter during the important period just before the OPEC Conference last December in Caracas. To devise some means to quiet the market down was a common interest and urgent task of the consuming countries. It was therefore decided to convene the IEA Ministerial Conference to make an immediate display of the solidarity of the consuming countries.

One of the most important points of the conference is that the U.S., considering decreased production by OPEC in 1980 to be inevitable, took a serious view of the supply and demand crisis which would thus develop, and to deal with it proposed that country-by-country import targets be cut back. There were many twists and turns but ultimately, through the opposition of the EC countries and Japan, the U.S. retreated from its original demands and it was decided to leave settlement of the problem to the March 1980 Cabinet Session. Looking back at this experience, I have to wonder why the U.S. was wildly sounding the alarm about 1980 oil market conditions like that and what its intention could have been, and suspect that the U.S. was expecting some sort of sudden change in the Middle East situation. Since the assertions of the U.S. had been made known before the conference on 10 December, I had planned not to return directly to Tokyo after the conference, but to stop in Washington and seek out the intentions of the U.S. In their talks on 10 December, however, Secretary of State Vance expressed his displeasure to Foreign Minister Okita regarding Japan's uncooperative attitude on the hostage issue. Because this was sensationalized by the press, there was a sudden manifestation of the displeasure of the U.S. Government and citizenry with Japan's lukewarm attitude, and this spread like wildfire.

U.S. displeasure with Japan over the hostage issue can be summarized in three points. First, Japan's basic stance on the hostage issue was not clear. Immediately after the hostage problem arose on 4 November, the leaders of European countries like Britain, France and West Germany conveyed to the president of the U.S. their view that to take diplomatic personnel as hostages is a clear violation of international law and that they thus fully support U.S. Government efforts for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages. The Japanese Government, by contrast, did not make a clear statement of its views for some time. Finally in the Security Council meeting about a month after the incident occurred, the Japanese delegate made a speech condemning the taking of hostages, but the U.S. Government was greatly disappointed with the lukewarm content of the speech. Second, immediately after the U.S. Government announced its embargo of Iranian oil imports, Japanese companies contracted to import Iranian crude in large volumes and at abnormally high prices. This was an "insensitive" act which ran counter to U.S. efforts for the release of the hostages. Third, it is deplorable that Japanese banks took steps to diminish the effect of the measures the U.S. Government adopted to freeze Iranian financial assets.

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Reduced U.S. 'Crusade' Capability

Those three points are the surface logic for U.S. displeasure. If the displeasure were limited strictly to the dimension of logic, the problem would not be all that difficult to deal with. The real difficulty of the displeasure with Japan which has arisen in connection with the hostage situation is that it threatens to burst through the bounds of reason and become an emotional explosion at any moment.

In the days following the Okita-Vance talks newspaper and television editorials critical of Japan appeared all across the U.S.; this situation had the aspect of a flame on the prairie in an extreme drought with high wind warnings. Politicians in any country are sensitive to public opinion. Seeing this situation, House Speaker O'Neill made a statement to the effect that Japan's actions improved considerably after it was punished for its dirty trick at Pearl Harbor, and its inexcusable behavior this time will require that it be taught another lesson. Senator Ross started a campaign to introduce a resolution in the Senate condemning Japan's attitude on the hostage situation. Representative Gibbons said he would introduce legislation in Congress to impose a temporary 50 percent punitive tariff on goods imported to America from countries which do not cooperate with the U.S. on the hostage situation. Because various political calculations are involved in these moves by politicians, we should not upset ourselves by taking them at face value. But if we simply look on unconcerned, there is great danger that the situation will become a conflagration greater than expected by those who start it, and will become uncontrollable.

My basis for this judgment is not simple intuition; it has a certain logical foundation, to which I will make brief reference. In my view, the Americans are the kind of people who desire to intoxicate themselves by fulfilling their missions. This springs, needless to say, from the historical process of America's independence and its founding, and from the grand concepts involved in that process. The most important hereditary factors which make America America, along with the Stars and Stripes and the English language, are the principles delineated in the American declaration of independence and the sense of mission to spread these principles across the face of the earth. This point is not easy to understand for a singular people like the Japanese, whose identity as Japanese is self-evident. But for a racially and religiously diverse nation like the U.S. there is great significance in having this missionary spirit in common--the significance of establishing their national identity.

The period from America's entry into World War II until its defeat in Vietnam became apparent was one in which "the American Crusade" was pursued on a worldwide scale, and one in which Americans' ambition to complete missions was met without difficulty. But the glory of this period was dragged through the mire of Vietnam. Just as Rome was not built in a day, the decline of an empire and the transformation of the times develop from chains of many events. In addition to Vietnam there were the Nixon shocks of 1971, the Watergate

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affair, the Middle East crisis and oil crisis of the fall of 1973, the development of runaway inflation in the U.S. accompanied by the decline of the dollar and the competitiveness of American industry, the exposure of the great gap between the theory and reality of Carter's human rights diplomacy, the sudden fall of the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran, the contrasting ominous incursions of the Soviet Union into places like Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan, the decline of U.S. leadership in the Middle East peace problem, the trend toward reduction and partial reversal of U.S. military superiority over the Soviets, and so on and on. Taking a page from world history, we have to see in these events a clear decline in the capability of the U.S. to conduct its crusade. And we must suppose, as the natural result, that the missionary spirit is not burning in the American people, and that a mood of gloom and depression is mounting in their breasts. What has pushed this sort of unfulfilled desire nearly to the breaking point is the matter of the "hijacking" of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

Considered from the U.S. point of view this incident was a clear violation of international law as well as an open insult to the U.S. Thus it was not an insult to the U.S. alone, but a challenge to the international community and to international law. To speak in terms of American westerns, the Indians captured and abused several dozen white men--in other words, the "barbarians" were seen to defeat "civilization" and the missionary spirit of the entire American nation could not but boil over. In the old days the U.S., waving the flag of "civilization," would have had to punish Iran to reestablish justice with the full support of its allies. But if force were used there would be the danger, first, that the lives of hostages would be lost. Second, it is likely that as a result the situation in Iran would be thrown into confusion, Iran's oil supply capacity would drop sharply in the short run, and in the long run Iran would become communist. Because the world oil situation is, as stated at the beginning, in a quite unstable state, a sharp drop in Iran's oil supply capacity would deal a grave blow to the world economy. Thus, since the use of force would involve grave danger not only to the lives of the hostages but to the future of Iran and the free world as well, the U.S. Government cannot decide to use force. Therefore the frustration of the U.S. people has come closer and closer to the breaking point.

Japan's Situation and Logic

In such a situation the U.S. Government authorities have had to devise tranquilizing makeshift policies to prevent an explosion of popular discontent. While they did put pressure on the Iranian Government, one can suppose that such measures as the embargo of Iranian oil, the freeze of Iranian financial assets and the UN Security Council resolution condemning Iran also had significance as counter-measures for U.S. public opinion. The appearance of Japan's actions from the U.S. position is this: while the U.S. is racking its brains to come up with an attack against the "Indians," Japan is speaking vaguely as though the "Indians" might also be right, and plays the role

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the greedy merchant who secretly sells guns to the "Indians." There are complaints that Japan understands neither the labors of the U.S. Government nor the smoldering emotions of the American people, which lead to the statements that Japan is too "insensitive."

The above is my interpretation of the logic of the Americans, and of course there is a corresponding logic on the Japanese side.

First, unlike the U.S., Japan is quite poor in domestic energy resources, so if oil imports are substantially impaired, the Japanese economy actually faces a life or death crisis. And as stated at the outset, world oil market conditions are in a very unstable state now. Moreover, the major oil companies have restricted their supplies of oil to Japan in rapid succession (prior to the Iranian revolution the majors provided Japan's independent oil companies with 1.4 million barrels of crude oil, but lately this has been reduced to 0.4 million barrels and it is expected to reach zero during 1980). Among the many oil companies there are those who feel the present state is like sitting and waiting to die, and the managers of such companies tend toward the frame of mind that they have no choice but to buy Iran's high-priced oil. Soon after the U.S. embargo on Iranian crude oil imports, the National Iranian Oil Company [NIOC] pressed Japanese companies to buy 20 or 30 million barrels of crude oil on a spot basis, and hinted that if the Japanese companies refused, there would be no guarantee of crude oil supplies on a term contract basis in 1980. For Japanese companies in the frame of mind mentioned above, this offer was hard to refuse. If the U.S. Government wanted to use all means to prevent these oil purchases by Japanese companies, it really should have devised some sort of buffer measures, like stopping the American majors from reducing crude oil supplies to Japan, or permitting Alaskan crude oil to be exported to Japan. And if the Japanese Government gave administrative guidance not to buy at high prices which the companies heeded, and they then suffered losses because they could not obtain crude oil or because crude oil prices shot up later, would the Japanese Government compensate their losses? Since neither the U.S. or Japanese Government would take over the management responsibility of the companies, the managers who were responsible had to accept NIOC's offer. Moreover, it was not Japanese companies alone that bought Iranian crude oil at high prices. Certainly Japanese companies did buy large quantities, but the truth is that European companies also bought at high prices. I can't understand why Japan alone was labelled "insensitive."

That is the story told by the Japanese companies that bought the oil in question. The Japanese Government doesn't support it fully, but it cannot be denied that there are claims which ought to be listened to included in it. In particular, the fact that Iranian oil has far greater importance for the economy of Japan than for the economy of the U.S. is one which the U.S. must be made to understand.

Second, about 850 Japanese reside in Iran at present. Action in connection with the problem of the American hostages must be taken cautiously, so that deterioration of Japanese-Iranian relations will not affect the security of Japanese residents as well as the supply of oil.

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Third is a point with which we should not meddle now but should, I think, study after the hostage problem is resolved: at the root of the present incident lies a grave and complex history of interaction between the U.S. and Iran. So that American justice for Iran will not be the hypocritical justice of "white men" toward "Indians," the U.S. must take a cool view of this grave history.

Fourth, it may well be that the more the U.S. squeezes Iran, the more Iran will be driven toward the Soviet Union. There are rumors that the Soviets have asked to buy any amount of Iranian oil, and that Soviet or east European technicians have gone to Iran's oil fields, and these rumors cannot really just be laughed off.

Fifth, while I am no expert and do not know the details, generally speaking I think the actions of Japanese banks were not much different from those of European banks, and that there is really not much basis for loud criticism of Japanese banks alone.

Sixth, I am not satisfied with the method and procedures of the U.S. criticism of Japan. The U.S. made the criticism that Japan's actions lack the "sensitivity" expected of an ally. If such discontent was present, quietly conveying it and requesting improvement through the diplomatic channels normally used would show the "sensitivity" which is normal when aligning views among allies and friendly nations. In fact, prior to the Vance-Okita talks we had already had a considerable exchange of views with the U.S. Department of Energy. The American Government had any number of opportunities to state their displeasure with Japan. We certainly didn't take the haughty attitude of refusing to listen. It can only be called surprising and mortifying that the U.S., without making full use of the usual diplomatic channels, used the loudspeaker of journalism to make the emotional criticism of Japanese "insensitivity" and "unseemly haste."

Better Explanation by Administration Officials

A summary of Japanese logic and emotion on the Japanese-U.S. friction involved in the hostage problem would be largely like the above. Needless to say, what I have stated here is not the official view of the Japanese Government. It is a synthesis I have made of the views of persons in a variety of public and private positions, such as Japanese businessmen, government officials including myself, journalists and so on. Accordingly, the "Japanese logic" I have stated does not necessarily match the Japanese views that have been conveyed to the U.S. through formal channels.

I am an official of the Japanese Government, and one who is directly involved in the Japanese-U.S. issue taken up here. Moreover, I have just stated my doubts about the U.S. Government's publicity method in this matter. So I must put in some explanation on the propriety and necessity of writing this sort of article.

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There is the saying "judges don't apologize." Although not to the same extent as for judicial officials, there is the tradition that administrative officials also disdain to "apologize." As the deeply emotional phrase, "silent navy," illustrates, this tradition is still held laudable in today's Japan. But while "silence is golden" is traditional as the attitude of the "players," among the "reporters" there is a growing tendency to say, "gab is gold." Reporters armed with "the right to know" surround the "silent players" gathering news with "hit and run" tactics. If the silence of the players prevails on the key points, the reporters ultimately have no choice but to report using the method of inference from fragments.

When this is the case the people's "right to know"--the demand for facts--can only be expected to provide fiction in the worst case, and a mixture of "truths and poetry" in many cases. Often the "truths" vary with the teller. This being the case, in order to search out the "truths" it is necessary to obtain the testimony of as many participants as possible and conduct a cross examination. To look at the state of journalism these days, there is too much testimony from the reporters and too little from the players. As a result, "images" which are divorced from the "truths" are being disseminated, and public opinion is often formed on the basis of these "images." Needless to say, politics, diplomacy and public affairs in a democratic country are greatly influenced by public opinion. If this public opinion is swayed by "images" divorced from the "truths," the situation is serious. In some circumstances it is necessary to reconsider the propriety of the tradition that "no comment" on public opinion is best.

Although there are many restrictions, from the obligation of confidentiality under the civil service act diplomatic confidentiality to the lack of time, I think it is best for even the players who are government officials to announce the "truths" which reflect their own consciences. They say, "the pheasant would not be caught but for its cries." Considered in terms of individual profits and losses, writing is an incredibly troublesome loss, but taking the larger view, it may well be better to take the part of the "curious pheasant." This all sounds like a lengthy excuse, but if I may state my intention, it is to say that the purpose of this article is not propaganda or agitation.

By introducing the perspective of one "player" who participated in this still fresh incident of friction between Japan and the U.S. I think I can present--and indeed I must present--a means to objectively consider Japan's course in the decade of the 1980's. (Please understand that explanation of this sort is necessary, in certain circumstances, when one in government service writes about a delicate topic.)

My Task in Washington

On 10 December 1979 the Okita-Vance talks were held, and on 11 December, as tension between Japan and the U.S. was mounting sharply, I flew from Paris to Washington, where I stayed until the 16th. Naturally the purpose of my visit

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to Washington was changed from exploration of the real intentions of the U.S. policies which became apparent at the IEA ministerial conference, as stated earlier, to maneuvering to avoid, for the present, friction between Japan and the U.S. This was like a fire engine out on patrol running right into a conflagration.

Here, then, are the personalities I met with in Washington: Treasury Secretary Miller (with Under Secretary Carswell and Assistant Secretary Solomon), Ambassador Henry Owen, Energy Secretary Duncan (with Assistant Secretary Goldmann), Senator Ross, Representative Gibbons, and Under Secretary of State Cooper.

I cannot go into the details of what was said to whom. But my task, as a "fire engine," was to prevent the on-going criticism to spread like wildfire. Moreover, since I was there in the capacity of MITI Deputy Minister for International Affairs, I had neither status nor ability to speak about the statement in the UN Security Council or the actions of Japanese banks. My job was focussed on the single point of how to quiet the criticism of Japanese high-priced purchases of Iranian oil.

I explained a considerable portion of the "Japanese logic" stated above, and requested understanding of Japan's position, but it was certainly impossible to extinguish the flame by just that means. The point of the firefighting was, first, to admit Japan's guilt in the act of buying 22 million barrels of Iranian crude oil for about 40 dollars per barrel, and second, to declare that the Japanese Government would make the maximum effort to prevent the reoccurrence of such an act. I maintained close contact with Tokyo, and with Tokyo's approval I explained these two points to each of those I met with. Thinking that stating them publicly would be necessary in terms of American public opinion, I decided to conduct a formal interview with about 40 foreign and domestic reporters on 14 December with the expectation of having to lie down on the bed of nails. Here is the full text of the statement I read at that time (original in English):

"A number of Japanese companies have ignored the guidelines on spot crude transactions established by the Japanese Government and purchased Iranian oil in large volumes at high prices, this is deplorable.

"We have received the U.S. Government's complaint that acts of this sort impair the effectiveness of the import embargo against Iranian oil which the U.S. Government established as an aid to resolution of the hostage problem. Unfortunately we must admit that this complaint is proper. Since not only the U.S. but Japan as well has a serious interest in the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages, the government, people and companies of Japan cannot hold back on the cooperation necessary to make the U.S. Government's efforts on this point effective.

"We confirm our policy of giving Japanese companies strict guidance to behave properly and not to repeat acts which would hinder resolution of the hostage problem.

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"Having learned a painful lesson this time, in the future Japanese enterprises will be sure to observe present Japanese Government guidelines or new guidelines which may be established in connection with developments in the hostage situation.

"Just as our present guidelines are in harmony with U.S. Government strategy on release of the hostages, we will continue to maintain close contact with the U.S. Government hereafter.

"By measures of this sort, Japan's imports of Iranian oil will be held below a daily volume of about 620,000 barrels, the import level prior to the occurrence of the hostage problem.

"Finally, I wish to appeal one fact to the people of America. It is the hard fact that without a suitable supply of oil from the Middle East including Iran, existence would become difficult for Japan and the entire free world.

"Considering the geopolitical point of view as well, Iran's stability is indispensable to the stability of the Middle East, and thus to the peace and prosperity of the world. Accordingly, it is very important to us that some day Iran be warmly welcomed within a free and square world order, and that a place be ready for it.

"We hope that the great American nation, though it is faced with this painful hostage problem, will act calmly without losing its historical perspective. I am convinced that the day will come when Japan, the U.S. and all the countries of the world will join in stabler and more friendly relations with the 35 million people of Iran, and that the day must come soon. I wish to convey this conviction to all the people of America."

'Fetters' of Japanese-Iranian Relations

There were questions and answers for 30 minutes at the end of my statement, but there were no sharp questions critical of Japan. To the contrary, the questions were all in sympathy with Japan's position: "Is the U.S. Government fully aware of the majors' reduction of oil supplies to Japan?", "If the supply of Iranian oil to Japan were reduced or suspended, would you ask the U.S. Government to make up the difference?" and so on. And I was surprised to see that there were no rebuttals to the final part of my statement, that is, to the hope that the U.S. will act cautiously, taking a long-term view of the situation in Iran following the end of the hostage problem. I felt like a fireman standing at the scene of the fire when he knows the flames are abating.

Looking at the course of events since then, we know that through the Ohira-Mansfield talks and the prime minister's letter to the President, the flames have finally died down. But the embers are still glowing, and it should be noted that the "drought warnings" have not been eliminated either. Until all the hostages in Tehran are released unharmed it will be necessary to continue a strict watch. If the American "fire" flares up again it can't be kept from

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becoming a wildfire, and unless firefighting operations are carried out with great care, the flame of criticism of Japan may flare up in Iran. If there is a blaze of criticism of Japan on both sides--the U.S. and Iran--Japan will experience burning pains on the dangerous bridge between them.

There is a famous story of the sword of Damocles. When Damocles, an official in the court of King Dionysius of Syracuse praised the happiness of the king, the king had Damocles sit on a throne over which a naked sword was suspended by a single horsehair to teach him that the fortune of the king was fraught with peril. The Japanese economy enjoys unprecedented prosperity now, but the Japanese people must not forget that this prosperity exists under the "sword of Damocles."

After going this way and that in America as a hastily prepared "fire engine," I returned to Japan, but there are two aftercare problems which must be faced.

The first is that of how Iran will respond to the action Japan has taken to quiet the anti-Japanese criticism in the U.S. The second is that of responding to the domestic complaint that the Government of Japan was too servile with respect to this criticism of Japan by the U.S. I will make a brief statement here of my thinking on these two problems.

The first problem: Needless to say, maintaining friendly relations between Iran and Japan is quite an important national interest and national policy for Japan. The reasons for this have already been given. In order to maintain friendly relations with Iran, I visited Tehran two times last year, in September and in October. That is, the progress of the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Project (hereafter IJPC), a joint venture of the Mitsui Group and the National Iran Petrochemical Corporation in Bandar Khomeini, tends to have a decisive influence on friendly relations between Japan and Iran, and I have gone to Tehran twice since last summer to work on that problem. The second time I accompanied then Minister of International Trade and Industry Ezaki. It was his judgment that Japan's abandonment of the IJPC project at that stage would clearly cause an irreparable rift in friendly relations between Japan and Iran. We thought it was indispensable that the Japanese Government prop up the IJPC project, not to rescue Mitsui, but to prevent the complete failure of friendly relations between Japan and Iran. For that purpose we literally "rushed about from east to west." In the end the IJPC project was promoted from a "Mitsui project" to a "national project," and it was decided to provide 20 billion yen from the Overseas Economic Development Fund and Export-Import Bank financing of 80 billion yen. It is well known that there was much criticism of that government policy, but I was then and am now confident that the policy was correct.

The Iranian Government has been eager for progress on the IJPC project. Its eagerness is proper in light of economic logic. Progress on this project would be impossible without Japanese cooperation. Because of unforeseen circumstances, the financial burden and risk burden became excessive, and greater than the Mitsui group could bear alone. It thus became impossible to carry out

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"Japanese cooperation" unless it were propped up by the Japanese Government. It was clear that if, in such circumstances, the Japanese Government were to pull out the props, the project would collapse and a crack would appear in the friendly relations between Japan and Iran. If Japan had deliberately allowed a crack in friendly relations and then said Japan needs Iranian oil, it would be sure to be scolded by Iran as "insensitive." To take a different approach, if Japan were to provide Iran with economic aid including the 20 billion yen contribution and the 80 billion yen financing, it would be possible for Iran to push the IJPC project as a monument to the revolution, and possible for Japan to strengthen the friendly relations between Japan and Iran which are the basis of a stable supply of oil. They say "children are fetters." For empty-handed Japan, which has little military or political force and which cannot export weapons, this IJPC project can be called the "fetters" of Japanese-Iranian relations.

Introspection on Japanese-American Friction

With this attitude, we worked frantically to prevent the failure of IJPC. I, who put that much importance on relations between Japan and Iran, had no choice but to perform work in Washington which would tend to strain that relationship. If there is a decisive deterioration in relations between Japan and Iran because of that work, I will truly be in a bad spot. Aside from my personal position, the nation of Japan is liable to be put in a bad spot. On the other hand, Japan has concluded the Security Treaty with the U.S., and the U.S. is a trade partner with which we have imports and exports amounting to over 40 billion dollars. Japan and the U.S. are clearly in an inseparable relationship of interdependence. The only choice which Japan can make is, ultimately, to put its full force into maintaining the overall friendly relationship between Japan and Iran but, where the hostage issue is concerned, while expressing understanding for the Iranian people's anger at Pahlavi as the setting for the issue, to condemn acts of "hijacking" and strongly support U.S. policy to whatever extent necessary for the resolution of this issue.

The above are general remarks. The first particular with which we were immediately faced was the negotiations to conclude the 1980 term contracts for Iranian crude oil. There is no room to go into the details of the negotiations, but in any case, public and private officials stuck by the domestic and international telephone from the last part of 1979 through the morning of New Year's day doing work as painful and delicate as walking a razor blade. To look just at the results, a "long-term contract" to purchase 500,000 B/D of Iranian crude oil at a per barrel price of 30 dollars was concluded. This conclusion was felicitous for Japan, which was directly concerned, and probably for Iran as well, and was no source of dissatisfaction for the U.S. Unlike the previous occasion, the public and the private officials cooperated closely and thus made their way across the razor blade without injury.

Next I will state my personal view regarding the criticism that the Japanese Government was too timid toward the U.S. in this incident of friction between the two.

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When I take an impartial look back at the experience so far, I feel there are more than a few points which require self-examination in terms of the sins of commission and omission by the Japanese Government and companies. Of course this is nothing more than hindsight. It is the nature of man to think "I should have done this, I should have done that;" following that nature I will grumble a bit here. I think that deciding and regulating our actions on the basis of resolute foresight is essential in order to ride out the stormy waves of international society, but Japanese as a group still seem to lack that sort of austerity.

The first point of introspection, then, is that in the event of an incident like the takeover of an embassy and the holding of embassy personnel as hostages--a clear violation of laws and principles--it is logical, proper and realistically more effective to make Japan's basic position explicit as quickly as possible. The countries of Europe did this and Japan did not.

The second point of introspection is that, as stated earlier, while the high-priced purchase of Iranian oil by Japan's trading companies and oil companies was quite reasonable in the dimension of the enterprise, when considered from a higher dimension--or judged in terms of its effects--it must be called lacking in circumspection. Comparing the experience of the Iranian crude oil purchases under discussion with the experience of conclusion of the term contracts at year's end, I feel there is no question but that the former involved a lapse deserving of the condemnation, "with unseemly haste." Oil has now taken on strong coloration as a political commodity. Thus there is no guarantee that transactions undertaken solely on the basis of the company's economic judgment will result in "preestablished harmony."

The third point of introspection is that, if the first two are correct, MITI should really restrain the evasions of the companies more forcefully. Generally speaking there are a variety of firm and flexible theories on administrative guidance, some saying that in principle it should not be given and some saying it should be more compulsory. Like one's golf grip, this is quite a difficult question, but judging the incident by hindsight, I think it would have been better to have given stronger administrative guidance.

The fourth point of introspection is the inadequacy of reconnaissance that has been traditional since Midway. If we had possessed a proper reading at the proper time of the psychological state of America's people, journalists, politicians and administration in regard to the hostage issue, we could have made a superior response.

The fifth point of introspection is the fact that in incidents like this where we are caught between at least two other countries like the U.S. and Iran, where politics, diplomacy and economics are intertwined, where the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Industry and Finance are all involved in the administration of the issue, and where the trading companies, oil companies and banks are all taking part--where we are faced with complex, multidimensional and difficult problems--our present system and technique for resolving the problems are obviously antiquated.

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Introspection of this sort is easy, but making concrete improvements on the basis of it is a task of extreme difficulty. We should be aware, however, that the eruption of incidents of this sort will not be exceptional if Japan is to live in the international society of the 1980's. That being the case, in order to withstand the storms of the times we must improve our political, administrative and economic systems, develop new techniques to manage the systems, and overcome functional impediments. The core of the problem of administrative reform today is to form within the government administrative structure an organization of highest quality to serve as the frontal lobe of the cerebrum. This could be called an intellectual concentration of the political administrative machinery. Compared in importance with this problem, the problem of reducing the number of public corporations can be called a mere beginning of administrative reform.

Needless to say, I am not deluded into thinking that I can take on this great problem in this short essay. Nevertheless, I think the key to handling this great problem may well lie in a change of awareness on a national scale, so I would like to complete this article by stating a few personal views on this point.

'Merchant Japan's' Art of Self-Preservation

In the year of 1979 I traveled, in connection with the energy issue, seven times to Europe, three times to the U.S., twice to Mexico, twice to Iran and once to Australia. For this work I was sometimes said to be begging for oil, sometimes accused of rescuing Mitsui, and sometimes criticized for bowing to the U.S.

This seems eccentric, but my frank view toward these criticisms is that it is necessary to reflect deeply, on a nationwide scale, on whether we choose the life-style of the merchant or that of the warrior for the Nation of Japan.

I will describe the value judgment briefly: post-war Japan chose to exist as a "merchant" country. By "merchant" I mean, needless to say, the Tokugawa period social class. It is true that, "... although merchants held the lowest position in the ranking of warriors, farmers, artisans and merchants, they held so much power that Honda Toshiaki could say, 'although from the outside the warriors seemed to have control within Japan, the truth is that the merchants were in control'" (from Shichihei Yamamoto's "Spirit of Japanese Capitalism").

Despite this, it is the warriors who held political, police and military authority, so the merchant, while maintaining his economic power, was required to use great circumspection in adjusting relations with the warrior. For example, those who set up shop before the gate of the warrior Tanuma Itsuji often had to rely on the merchant's art of self-preservation. In order to maintain their prosperity, merchants had to offer their consideration and money with a hundred times the seriousness and circumspection of today's KDD. Nevertheless, it was still not always possible to avoid the misfortune of Zeniya Gohei.

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It seems to me that today's international society shares features of Tokugawa social structure. For example, Japan is a merchant and artisan, the U.S. and the Soviet Union combine the roles of warriors, farmers, artisans and merchants, and many developing countries play the farmers. If the warriors in international society did not exercise force and the rules of merchants and artisans were strictly observed, we could sing all the more loudly that "the world exists for the sake of Japan." But unfortunately reality is different. Mao Zedong is said to have said, "a revolution is not a [dancing] ball"; if I may parody Mao, then "international society is not a place for a ball--it is halfway a jungle." The existence of Japan, then, is nearly that of a rabbit that has lived and grown fat in the jungle. We must not delude ourselves that the bears and wolves will say, "poor little rabbit, with no claws or fangs." For rabbits to multiply in the jungle or merchants to prosper in a society of warriors, they need superior information-gathering capabilities, conceptual abilities, intuition, diplomatic ability, and sometimes the ability to curry favor. I don't think rabbits or merchants can get by just sounding pretty phrases like justice, peace and freedom, or non-discrimination.

Taking an unbiased look at the behavior of today's "merchant Japan," I do not think we are offering our consideration and money in international society with the seriousness and circumspection of the merchants of the Tokugawa period. If I may give one example, the response of the officials and people of Japan to the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees is not only lacking in humanism, it falls short in terms of serious consideration for international society. Our economic cooperation with developing nations is not adequate as a serious and circumspect offer of either consideration or money. It would be hard to say that the officials and people use either the intuition of the merchant or the ears of the rabbit in sensing the deep-rooted nature of this sort of criticism of Japan.

Foreigners often complain that Japan is a closed society. I have had to feel that is true as I have read recent reports in connection with KDD. It appears that KDD has offered its consideration and money in a way reminiscent of the Tokugawa merchant, not in the "jungle" as in Tokugawa times, but within Japan itself. Though not to the same extent as KDD, Japanese enterprises in general make much of entertainment expense accounts. This Japanese entertainment is aimed primarily at smoothing out Japanese interpersonal relationships. In other words, the "inner circle" is emphasized, and everything possible is done to bring social relationships into the circle.

Spending a little expense account money, however, will not draw in international society. For all their efforts, the best KDD could do was to create a telecommunications family as the inner circle, and sizewise, it is nothing to speak of. In fact, because they paid too much attention to the "inner circle" policy, they became specialists who only watched their own feet, and lost their awareness of the wide world.

It is easy to throw accusations at KDD, but if we look at ourselves, hasn't Japan as a whole become a giant KDD? If we list the major incidents of Japan's

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"inner circles" which have come up in the past few years, there are Lockheed, Grumman, JRCC, the "Bureaucratic Paradise," public corporation cutbacks, the financial crises, general consumption tax opposition, welfare cutback opposition, commodity prices from kerosene to herring roe, the commotion over electricity and gas marginal profit refunds, Three Mile Island and opposition to atomic development, opposition to synthetic detergents, opposition to hunting of mountain goats, the death of Ian Ian, the remarriage of Kan Kan, struggles within the LDP, struggles among the opposition parties; etc. etc. All of these are big problems without question, but the overall impression is that of a tempest in a teapot. I am afraid that if we are occupied entirely with this sort of problem, the "Nippon Maru" will become unable to withstand the wind and waves of the great ocean outside the teapot.

Stick to the Way of the Merchant

I have no intention of moralizing about the KDD problem, but viewed in terms of the "merchant" theory, KDD was not a true merchant. It was, I am forced to say, an imitation merchant. Had it been a true merchant it would not have restricted its view of the world to a tight "inner circle," but would have used a broader range of views, information, strategies and values, and would not have done a foolish thing as to drive itself into a position like a fly caught in a glass.

If Japan chooses the path of living as a merchant country in international society, it is important that it stick to the way of the merchant. When necessary it will have to beg for oil from the oil-producing countries, and at times it may have to scrape and bow and beg the forgiveness of the warriors. At the same time, it will have to know the strengths and weaknesses of the warrior countries and oil countries, discern the true trend of the times and currents of history, and have the shrewdness not to comport itself improperly. It is also essential that it have the courage to put out large sums at the proper times.

First, the Japanese as a body must change their stance from introversion to extroversion. They must make the leap from the small shopkeeper's outlook of "walking with eyes cast down to find any dropped coins" to the large merchant's outlook of "walking with head held high to greet the world."

Second, the merchant must suppress emotion and make strict calculations. Not being influenced by hopeful estimates, he must foster the ability to gather lots of information, analyze it, and correctly discern the realities. In connection with this point, I have to give particular stress to the importance of the role of the mass media. The newspapers make stern criticisms of politics, administration and business, and that's just fine. My personal view is that they are not stern enough. If the people have the "right to know," the newspapers must observe the "obligation not to disseminate false information." But it must be said that from the position of the readers, discipline is slack in regard to violation of this obligation. As a result, people like the Japanese

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who read the newspapers seriously experience disorders in their awareness of reality and it's hard to say but it could tend to lose the strictness of their calculations. Unfortunately, when this is the case, the merchant country could possibly be on the road to bankruptcy.

The role of the scholar is also important in making accurate judgments. So that it won't be said "the merchant is stingy and has no learning," he must make good use of scholars. But if I may put in one order, it is that among the scholars and cultured people there must be those with this unusual concept: if by just buying European and American theories and values we import goods which do not fit the Japanese, then it will be the Japanese that look strange. If we listen to scholars and people of culture with the idea that they all say wonderful things, we are liable to have the bitter experience of bankruptcy; inexperienced merchants must be very cautious.

Third, merchants must abandon the idea of being taken care of. It will not do for merchants to have excessive hopes or illusions about government protection or the goodwill of peace-loving peoples. I do not know how great a man Mao Zedong may have been, but the parody of Mao given earlier is something merchants must always keep in mind.

These are a few ideas on how a merchant country should behave, but undoubtedly there are many Japanese who hold tightly to the value judgment of not wanting to be a merchant. If people making that sort of value judgment constitute the majority of the Japanese nation, then of course the style of Japan's behavior will have to change from that of the merchant to that of the warrior. But of course, a general remodeling of the shop from the merchant style to the warrior style will involve considerable expense.

Becoming a warrior requires, first and foremost, the "forebearance" mentioned by Yukichi Fukuzawa. The Japanese would have to give up begging for oil and wait for someone, from somewhere, to make home deliveries. And if it happens that the delivery is not made, they must have the spirit of trying to be a sport and maintain the long-suffering spirit of going along unconcerned. If there is not enough kerosene for the winter, the people must bear the cold and not scold the government, demanding some sort of stately diplomacy. Second, it is wearing two swords that makes one a warrior. To maintain the appearance of a warrior in international society, one must strengthen military preparedness, even if it takes a large increase in taxes. And in wearing two swords, one must realize that there will be times when one cannot refuse to draw. For example, in the event of a threat against safe transit through the Strait of Hormuz we would have to be ready to rush to the scene, sword in hand. Even if we rely on the U.S. in the case of the Strait of Hormuz, we should still make it clear where and in what way Japan would share in the defense of its long sea lanes. And third, since arms exports are an important part of diplomacy for the warrior, we should abandon the present three principles on arms exports.

If the Japanese people are aware of these three points and will prepare an appropriate state of readiness, then without question our daily activities.

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especially in this field of resource diplomacy, will be much changed. Post-war Japan has, in reality, chosen the way of the merchant. But I think it would be of great profit for Japan, in deciding its future course, to take an objective look at the advantages and disadvantages of this other path, the way of the warrior.

Dangers of 'Something for Nothing'

We have the illusion that there must be some clever third way other than the way of the merchant and the way of the warrior. That is, we want to be sometimes a warrior and sometimes a merchant depending on the circumstances. We want to swagger like a warrior and say fine-sounding things, and at the same time we want the luxuries of the merchant. We do not like either the forbearance of the warrior or the humility of the merchant. We do not like to pay out money under any circumstances, and we want to go along avoiding responsibility. To speak in specific terms, we want lots of cheap kerosene, but we do not want to do mean things like beg for oil. We would rather not meekly provide economic cooperation to the oil-producing countries, and we consider it a waste of tax money to give IJPC 20 billion yen of government funds. We have to be firm with the U.S. even to the point of appearing anti-American, but we hope the U.S. will maintain our safety in the Strait of Hormuz. The major oil companies are the bad guys, but we hope the majors will be a safe supply for half the oil Japan consumes. Oil companies and power companies must not be established, and we get upset when we hear about marginal profits, but we oppose increased energy taxes for any reason whatever. But however much the government, oil companies and power companies may need money, we insist on development of oil fields and alternative sources of energy. We scream for "peace in Vietnam" (since that does not cost anything), but we do not want to do anything for the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees (which would involve a cost). I could go on and on. These are all in the spirit of the free ride, the free drink, the free meal. For living in the real world, this frame of mind does more harm than good. But people holding this selfish illusion do show up from time to time. I do not like even to think of such people, so there is no need to say more.

Looking forward, I am not confident that Japan can remain as a merchant country forever. For example, if on the one hand the U.S. loses the will and ability to fight for the security of other countries, while on the other hand there are great powers who nonchalantly make armed incursions into neighboring countries in the name of good neighbor treaties, the big question would be, without a doubt, whether Japan should remain a merchant country in such circumstances.

But as far as the present is concerned, the Japanese people are far from a state of mind to make this choice of destinies. Since peace has been miraculously preserved in the jungle for the 30 years since the war, there are more than a few people who think today's "rabbits' paradise" will last forever. Considering the present state of this sort of national awareness, I think what the Japanese have to do now is to change from an innocent pet rabbit to a somewhat more cunning wild rabbit.

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There was a time when we said, "Hold on, GNP." That was the foolishness of a pet rabbit who was supplied with all his needs. Nowadays there is a tendency, partly as a reaction, to say, "Go, GNP." But neither holding on nor going is the thing for a crafty, wild rabbit to do.

It is not bad to be preoccupied with GNP growth rates, but it is essential that we use clearer eyes and ears in taking a long-range view of the nature of Japan's security in the economic, political, military and diplomatic fields, and the future life-style of the Japanese people. If it is possible to endure present exigencies by upgrading the clarity of our eyes and ears--and that certainly will not be easy--it will mean unexpected good fortune. And so I think there is probably no path other than this one which Japan can choose now.

If, after risking our lives on the efforts of the rabbit and the intellectual intensity of the merchant, we see that our physical safety still cannot be guaranteed, then at that time our merchant country will be forced to convert itself to a warrior country.

Of course there are various nuances involved in this conversion. Back in the days of Sakai, its merchants were not strictly merchants; they not only sharpened their eyes and ears, but also unhesitatingly armed themselves.

But even for merchants the cost of arms is high; the "profit ratio for weapons" cannot be calculated simply. The phrase, "distinctioned is not argued a second time" applies only to individuals, not to the interests of social groups. Various life-styles are possible for Japan: The merchant country, the warrior-like merchant country, the merchant-like warrior country, the warrior country and so on. In choosing one of these paths the nation of Japan will have to go through the sufferings of purgatory. Passing through these sufferings of purgatory will burn away the illusions and wishful thinking and, I am confident, allow a realistic road for Japan to be chosen on the basis of pure reason.

Politicians and leaders will have to be strong to survive the 1980's, but it is of fundamental importance that all of the people of Japan give deep thought to Japan's life-style. It is in hopes of providing somewhat of a reminder of that point that I have stated here my recent experiences and the impressions based on them.

I understand the status ranking of merchants in the Tokugawa period was in the order of owner, head clerk, clerk, sales clerk and shop boy. If the head clerk is the prime minister and the clerks head the various ministries, then I am one of the crowd of petty sales clerks. What is stated above is no more than the rambling of a sales clerk of the merchant country of Japan, but this sales clerk will be grateful if the owner--the people of Japan--will let him pour out his petty views.

Postscript: This article was written with an understanding of the situation as of mid-January. Ominous sounds have continued to issue from Iran and Afghanistan, so for the time being, Japan will have to continue its trick of walking across the razor's edge.

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JCP CHAIRMAN INTERVIEWED BY NHK ON WORLD SITUATION

OW161022 Tokyo JPS in English 0909 GMT 16 May 80

[Interview with Kenji Miyamoto, chairman of the Presidium of the Japanese Communist Party on NHK TV program on 15 May by Keiichiro Yashiro: "Listening to Opposition Party Leaders--What Is Demanded of the Opposition Parties"]

[Text] Tokyo May 16 JPS--Kenji Miyamoto, chairman of the Presidium of the Japanese Communist Party, appeared in an NHK TV program on May 15, and revealed his views on the attitude to be taken by the JCP at the end term of the present Diet session, tackling the House of Councilors election, and dealing with the international situation. This was spoken in the NHK TV program "Listening to Opposition Party Leaders--What Is Demanded of the Opposition Parties," and the questioner was the NHK commentator Keiichiro Yashiro. The gist of what the Presidium chairman said follows:

Question: "Socialist Party Chairman Asukata says that the JCP takes to 'direct main blow at Social Democrats,' that is, to take the Social Democratic Party as an enemy. What do you say about this?"

Answer: "There was a promise in the past that we should discuss together the problem of a united front, but the Socialist Party has torn it up. Moreover, not only tearing it up, the Socialist Party yielded to the demand of the Komei Party 'to exclude the Communist Party,' and wrote down to exclude the JCP from the government program. No other party than the JCP is mentioned for the exclusion, so that they can join in with any party other than the JCP. Speaking especially from the JCP side, which is being excluded, such a step is unwarranted. It is from the defensive position that we say the Socialist Party has shifted away from the progressive movement."

Question: "The teachers' union of Tokyo decided to join the conference of trade unions for promotion of a united front, and this has become a big issue. How do you view this issue?"

Answer: "The background of high handed directive by the Japan Teacher's Union and the General Council of Trade Unions (SOHYO) is that the Japan Teachers' Union has gone completely to the right, to lean on SOHYO, and deciding for the Socialist-Komei agreement line, the line to exclude the JCP. So that they not accuse the Tokyo Teacher's Union of being insolent, but began putting them on disciplinary about the more of what had been proper and considered there were no rooms for interference in the past."

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Question: "The House of Councilors election is nearing. What is the controversial points, or how are you going to tackle it?"

Answer: "One of the characteristics of the present election is that the international issue holds sway on the election, take the Afghanistan issue or the Iranian issue. We are opposed to big power hegemonism, the outrageous way carried out by big power, in short, whether it may be the U.S., the Soviet Union or China.

"And not to the LDP politics, on all points. On the Socialist-Komei-DSP line, this will help the LDP politics, and if the LDP loses the majority, they will gain the political power, that is, there will be no change in LDP politics, and this means the continuation of LDP politics; therefore, we say no to this, too.

"Consequently it is the central issue to progressively change the Japanese politics, to increase the seats of the JCP, the really upright party, the forces for the united front to build a really progressive Japan, as the recent KDD case announcement reveals that only the communist members of the Diet are not subject to graft and corruption.

"It is said that (the outcome of the election) will be a reversal of the ruling party and the opposition parties, but I can clearly conclude that even if the present alliance of the Socialist-Komei-DSP increases their seats, this is nothing but an increase of new government parties."

Question: "Whether to be called the world strategy of the Soviet Union, or what kind of expansion the Soviet Union considers on the Third World, will the Soviet Union meddle with?"

Answer: "The Soviet Union has made a big mistake in the Afghanistan issue. This is completely alien to socialism. The JCP has criticized it, also the Italian and Spanish parties, and some parties in the international communist movement criticize it. Many countries in the nonaligned movement also criticize the Soviet Union.

"So that I want to keep on saying the Soviet Union to draw lessons from the world criticism, and return to the position of respect for the national sovereignty, and real peace, suitable of a socialist country.

"And at every opportunity we have, the JCP says to the Soviet Union to return Habomai and Shikotan Islands, and the Chishima Islands to Japan as soon as possible. (Yashiro agrees).

"Although the (Soviet) way is mistaken, the U.S. is making use of this, to expand armaments, to increase military spending. For successive generations, the U.S. has been the country to make use of such a pretext, but now Japan is being committed to this, and is attempting to expand armaments.

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"It is important for the world peace to dissolve the military blocs, and promote disarmament, and many countries to take the course towards peace and neutrality. Such a great gathering at Yugoslav President Tito's funeral has unexpectedly proven that the people of the world are seeking such a way (as Tito's)."

Question: "On the defense of the honor of one's country, I am anxious to know what do the Japanese people think about the idea of protection? I think this is the responsibility of politics. What do you think?"

Answer: "We are determined to abrogate the Japan-U.S. security treaty. But the Japanese nation holds the right for self-defense, so that when Japan becomes an independent country of neutrality, we will work for the neutrality and the self-defense, will resolutely stand against any aggression. We would like to take the position of real patriots, the position of the real progressive forces."

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

NEW KEIDANREN HEAD CRITICIZES CONSERVATIVES: INTRAPARTY STRIFE

OW260810 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 24 May 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] Yoshihiro Inayama, the newly inaugurated president of the powerful Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), Friday accused the on-going intraparty strife within the ruling conservative party of being "a form of political degeneration" stemming from politicians' "selfish lust for power and money."

He also said that the business world would support any political party which is committed to the preservation of a "free enterprise" system.

"This is not the question of the ruling party versus the opposition but the question of a liberalist government versus a socialist one," he observed.

Noting that it was most unlikely to happen that a majority of the Japanese voters would cast their ballots for a socialist government; Inayama said he did not care about the "formality" of government so long as the economic system could be maintained.

The 76-year-old Inayama made the remarks at a press conference immediately after he was officially elected the 5th president of Keidanren at its general meeting to succeed Toshiwo Doko.

Doko, who served as Keidanren chief for three two-year terms, was also elected honorary president of the organization.

In his inaugural press conference and also in his address to the Keidanren meeting, Inayama outlined his new policy for Japan's most powerful economic organization.

He said, "We are committed to the maintenance of the free enterprise system which features free competition. The problem, however, is that free competition does not necessarily contribute to the stabilization of the economy in today's world."

"It is high time for we business leaders to devise a new formula to stabilize the economy without depending solely on the mechanisms of free competition," Inayama said.

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Concurrently chairman of Nippon Steel Corp, the nation's largest, Inayama is widely known as a strong advocate of cartels for the sake of economic order.

He said he would strive to put the Japanese economy on a stable path through "cooperation" and "collaboration."

In the meantime, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira attended the Keidanren meeting and expressed his resolve, in his address, to remain in power despite the passage of the non-confidence vote against his cabinet and the subsequent dissolution of the Lower House for a general election.

He said, "I will strive to restore political stability by undergoing the baptism of the elections. This is why I dared to dissolve the Lower House to seek a public mandate."

Ten vice chairmen of Keidanren under Inayama are Katsuui Kawamata, chairman of Nissan Motor Co; Isamu Saheki, chairman of Kinki Nippon Railway Co; Norishige Hasegawa, chairman of Sumitomo Chemical Co; Gaishi Hiraiwa, president of the Tokyo Electric Power Co; Toshio Nakamura, chairman of the Mitsubishi Bank; Isamu Yamashita, chairman of Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co; Eishiro Saito, president of Nippon Steel Corp; Hirokichi Yoshiyama, president of Hitachi Ltd, and Nihachiro Hanamura, Keidanren director general.

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'JAPAN TIMES' POINTS TO SHAKINESS OF LDP'S INTRAPARTY TRUCE

OW260816 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 24 May 80 p 12

[Editorial: "The Shaky LDP Truce"]

[Text] The six-day chaos that plagued the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) following the May 16 debacle came to an abrupt end Thursday when the party leadership and the rebel, anti-Ohira group achieved a truce.

That the truce was achieved, however, was no surprise because both groups realized that they stood only to lose by remaining at loggerheads with each other through the two elections expected in late June. The consequence was obvious: divided the party will fall.

Thus, the two groups made a three-point agreement to patch up the self-inflicted wound. The points of agreement were: (1) Unity in party must be secured in order to win the two elections. (2) Factions must be promptly dissolved, and until this is done, the LDP regeneration council, the ad hoc body consisting of anti-Ohira factions within the LDP, is to suspend its activities. Upon the dissolution of factions, the council, too, is to be dissolved. (3) In the coming elections, the party will deal with its candidates, regardless of their factional affiliations, as before and in a fair manner.

The accord may be said to signify a major concession and a victory on the part of both groups. The Ohira leadership group can claim that it won from the dissident group a pledge to dissolve itself after the component factions are dissolved and that it will not engage in anti-leadership activities until the elections are over.

For the regeneration council, the rebel group, too, the truce was a victory because the leadership group promised not to discriminate against the LDP men affiliated with rebel factions in running for the Diet.

In other words, the Liberal-Democrats who helped by default the non-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ohira pass the Diet will not be penalized for their obviously anti-party act. Rather, they will be endorsed officially as Liberal-Democratic candidates, who are entitled to all the usual election-time assistance from the party headquarters.

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The accord reached this time, however, has obvious shortcomings, which in turn suggest that the parties to the agreement know full well that it is in accord of convenience.

For one thing, the parties to the accord know that the factions will not be dissolved, as the history of the LDP eloquently testifies. The only thing the leadership group was seriously interested in obtaining through this accord was a promise from the rebel group to refrain from anti-Ohira activities during the election campaign period. And as long as this could be secured, the leadership group was willing to forgive and forget the rebels.

Of supreme importance this time is that the LDP wins the elections, and for that, "unity in party" is essential.

It should be noted, however, that the LDP politicians on both sides did not come to their senses on their own. A crucial factor that brought about the rapprochement was the business interests that provide election funds to the LDP at each election time.

This time, the business world promised financial help to the LDP in the general election, to be held simultaneously with the Upper House election, on condition that the rival forces bury the hatchet. And such a demand was not difficult for the LDP leaders to accept because without campaign funds from the business sources, they could not possibly wage a successful election campaign.

According to reports, the allocation for the general election this time is to be 5 billion yen, which is considerably less than the figure for the last general election. The reason is that the business sources had already set aside 7 billion yen for the House of Councillors election. This figure, of course, had been pledged at a time when no one, not a soul, had ever dreamed that a general election would be held on the same day.

Aside from the amounts given the party as a single recipient, the business world is said to be giving an additional 3 billion yen to individual factions for the Upper House election. Thus, the Lower House election, which unexpectedly emerged, simply meant an additional outlay. Heavy as the new burden on the business interests may be, they could ill afford to ignore the LDP's plea for financial assistance because the exit of the conservative party from the political arena of Japan might very well mean the end of free enterprise in this country.

The LDP is now ready to move ahead toward the elections as one party. But the accord that makes this possible has not removed the causes of the problems that have afflicted the LDP, for example, factionalism, corruption, etc. What happened is only the postponement of dealing with these problems until the end of the elections.

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And even then, there is no promise that the problems will be dealt with squarely. Depending on the way the election campaigns are conducted and the results turn out, in fact, the differences among the factions now temporarily shelved might emerge worse than before.

That would mean that the LDP will continue to face a serious challenge to its qualifications as a political party to shoulder the burden of managing the affairs of the nation.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'AKAHATA' RAPS SOCIALIST PARTY STAND ON SECURITY TREATY

OW091031 Tokyo JPS in English 0907 GMT 9 May 80

[Text] Tokyo, May 9, JPS--AKAHATA on May 9 carried an editorial entitled "Socialist Party Pressed for an Answer on Security Affairs." The editorial points out that the Socialist Party has changed essentially its security policy, and that this will inevitably deepen the contradictions of the Socialist Party. The gist of the editorial follows.

In the Japan-U.S. summit talks on May 1 (May 2, Japan Standard Time), the U.S. side pressed for an increase in Japan's military budget to 1 percent of the GNP within 3 years from the next fiscal year. The Japanese side promised that the Japanese Government "will really work (to attain the goal) as an ally of the United States," the U.S. demand is in itself an outrageous interference in internal affairs, and will further load the Japanese economy which is already in failure, and will force sacrifices on the people's living.

In this circumstance the Socialist Party has taken down the flag of the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty by reaching in January the Socialist-Komei agreement on a coalition government program, and joined hands with the forces for the maintenance of the security treaty. Now the Socialist Party is severely being questioned on its attitude from wide sections of the people, including supporters of the Socialist Party.

On May 7, the Socialist Party published its "House of Councilors election platform--four objectives and eight big policies," but the "abrogation of the security treaty" has been taken away and is not included in the four objectives. In the "eight big policies," the title "Removal of the Security Treaty" is merely retained, but the past policy to notify the other part of the abrogation on the basis of Article 10 of the security treaty is not retained.

As the Japan-U.S. military alliance in the 30 years history of the security treaty has entered the most dangerous stage, the shift made by the Socialist Party is even more tragic. The recent dangerous development of the Japan-U.S. military alliance proves how contrary the Socialist-Komei agreement is to peace and the people's interests.

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As the House of Councilors election nears, the Socialist Party is calling for "anti-security treaty" at many places. But the more the contradiction is even more deepening because of the shift to the maintenance of the security treaty in the Socialist-Komei agreement, its contradiction and confusion are all the more conspicuous because the JSP is promoting election cooperation with the Democratic Socialist Party [DSP] in the Socialist-Komei-DSP alliance, the DSP which takes a more hawkish line than the LDP on the strengthening of the security treaty and the reinforcement of the self-defense forces.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

PARIS CORRESPONDENT COMPARES AMERICAN, EUROPEAN OUTLOOK

Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 21 Mar 80 pp 104-106

[Article: "Takashi Wada, ASAHI SHIMBUN Paris Bureau Chief Who Has Also Served in the United States, Comments on the Characteristics of Americans, Particularly As They Differ From Those of Europeans"]

[Excerpt] After living in Paris I feel a difference in relating to its people from that which I experienced in America or Japan. For example, when I chance to meet the old trash collector at my apartment house, or the attendant at the gas station I patronize, or the porter-handyman--all those people who are generally considered to be lower in class--on the street, they do not greet me or give any sign that they even see me. The old man who delivers the newspapers to the bureau every day, who good-naturedly smiles greetings while in the office, acts like a total stranger when I encounter him on the street, even only a few steps from the office door.

I was nonplussed by such manners at first, but as time passed I came to learn that this was their way of showing that they knew their place. In other words, in recognition that many ladies and gentlemen of the bourgeoisie wouldn't be caught dead talking to blue-collar workmen in overalls, they have reached a mutual understanding that they wouldn't know each other on a busy city street where there could be no telling who might see them.

On second thought, it's a manifestation of a technique that gives the appearance of not knowing what one actually does know.

Let us assume for a moment that a person knows 10 in a scale of 1 to 10. The American will proudly and forthrightly claim: "I know 10: But the tradition-bound people of this area will act as if "I know only 5," leading his counterpart to suspect that "this person probably knows a thing or two."

In a Fitzgerald story, "Paris Dies On A Rainy Morning," there is a passage where a man is dining out with his daughter in a Paris restaurant. The man, an American who had lost his wife, had just returned to Paris after several years and was seeing his only daughter who had been left behind in Paris. Though the meeting between father and daughter is a joyous one, the years

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of separation have caused their conversation to be somewhat stilted. Overhearing this, the waiter says: "What a charming girl. She speaks like a true Frenchwoman!"

Undoubtedly, there was an intangible something which made the waiter say that she spoke like a true woman of France, but to us foreigners they were both accomplished frauds. It is difficult to cope when confronted, particularly on the telephone, with a string of parenthetical expressions with rhetorical flourishes of reservations and doubts in contrived politeness; they tend to confuse the issue and deter us from making our original intent known. Admittedly, our linguistic deficiency plays a big role, but the sense of frustration arising from the awareness of being taken while engaged in a discussion cannot be assuaged by mere self-admonition; it leaves us with an eerie feeling of groping in space:

After spending days in the atmosphere described above, when an opportunity arises to talk to an American we find that we can understand what he is saying immediately and that the world suddenly becomes singularly simplistic. Just the other day, I had reason to negotiate a certain matter with an American, and the discussion was conducted on a point-by-point basis. It was so clear and concise that we were able to reach a point of agreement in no time. In broadly general terms, it must be that we synch better when we are talking to Americans.

When this feature is projected, one has to face up to the fact that the European is a very difficult customer. The American, having come up against this giant obstacle of the Old Continent, has to perform like a shadowboxer whose shadow is a exceedingly formidable foe!

Since the closing months of last year, the world has undergone some violent upheavals such as the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the Afghanistan event. Diplomatic reactions emanating from the White House have taken a vigorous turn, as evidenced by such as the economic sanctions against Iran, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the reactivation of military aid to Pakistan, and moves to revive the military draft. The hawkish trend is being accelerated by one event after another. There has even been the courageous threat that "we will not back down even from a U.S.-USSR military showdown if it comes to that." Although President Carter hoped to get the principal countries of the West to join him in this tough attitude, things haven't worked out just that way.

The principal countries of the West don't all have a world spread out before them with a wide ocean separating them, so one can't talk to them in the same vein as in a speech made to the people of the State of Georgia. Moreover, at a time when the influence that United States once had has ebbed, its loudly voiced threats are not enough to obtain immediate compliance. Feints and flattery have to be artfully orchestrated in order to form a successful threat, and studying President Carter's expressions on the TV screen we do not discern those qualities.

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Listening to his almost evangelical plea, "Why is it that you people who are supposed to be on my team refuse to understand the efforts we are making so wholeheartedly," we even feel a bit of pathos. So maybe it is understandable that the Europeans turn further away from developing events, feigning blindness, to wait for matters to cool down.

Unity isn't being assured for the boycott of the Moscow Olympics and the proposal to hold a conference of foreign ministers of the five Western powers to whip into shape a joint strategy for coping with the USSR may be destined for stillbirth. Recently, when the U.S. ambassador posted in Paris cried out in anguish in a speech at the American Club, "Come on, Europe, get in step with us!" it almost sounded like he was sadly abetting U.S. futility.

In confirmation of the great decision, the ambassador stated: "If foreign powers attempt to control the Arabian Gulf area, we will prevent it even if we have to resort to military force." He went on to say, "Some of the leaders in Europe are critical of America's policy; what, then would be appropriate compromises?" He continued by scolding Europe: "We do not ask that you act in harmony with every step we take, but we do not want a widening gap being created merely because one wants to express his independence."

My reaction to Ambassador Hartman's speech was one of awe and a resurgence of the realization that "this is America!" What flows there is not a hard sell of kindness but a form of humanitarianism. Since its arguments are based on the premise that "what we do is basically good," they are clear and logical. Nevertheless, the conclusions are not convincing. A thought wanders into my mind: "What happened to the learned elders during the Vietnam war?" And when this happens, because the arguments presented were so simplistically single-minded, the humanitarian aspect begins to fade.

The press, such as LE MONDE, reacted instantly. In a somewhat satirical editorial with the title, "hooray for the Difference Between France and America," it commented: "In utter frustration, Mr. Hartman opened up his heart and made a mess of things. There was something to be desired in the timing of his speech, which was delivered on the night before Secretary of State Vance's visit to France....Yesterday's image of a saint became that of an activist the very next day....Are we supposed to string along with each of these twists and turns?....Whether one likes it or not, neither Europe nor France is America. Admittedly their interests coincide from time to time, but they must not be mixed....Currently, if there were one policy that would benefit both the United States and Europe, it would be for the United States to stop wasting energy and control the issuance of the dollar." Although this took a sort of a circuitous route, it came across pretty harshly.

We discern a flicker of a plea implied in the criticism: "Oh, America! Don't just roar out your claims. Give a thought to someone else's position."

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When Washington talks about a U.S.-USSR military confrontation without adequately preparing the groundwork, Europe, which is contiguous to the USSR, feels shock waves. Seeing a photograph of National Security Advisor Brzezinski playing with a machinegun with a Pakistani soldier while he was visiting Pakistan, a certain European diplomat was heard to mumble: "How unconscionable." The joint statement issued by the Franco-West German summit contained the following words; "Europe, which has experienced having two great wars fought on its soil..." Here again, we feel that "Oh, America!" sentiment.

As one walks the streets of Paris he sees innumerable plaques memorializing casualties of the war. They are everywhere--in front of the Paris city hall, by the front door of Notre Dame--and though the words may differ, they are all in memory of those who lost their lives in the war. "Three Patriots Fell Here Defending the Freedom of Their Fatherland (year) (month) (day)" "The Invading German Army Murdered (number) of Innocent Young Girls Here (year) (month) (day)" "Patriot _____ Gunned Down in the Act of Guarding This Gate Unto Death (year) (month) (day)."

These aren't found only in Paris; in Dijon, on the walls of Bourgogne Palace, there are several dozen names of persons who tried to defend it during World War II. Of course, they also exist in Normandy and in Alsace-Lorraine.

During the past few days, my attention was attracted to these memorial plaques, which I usually walk by without noticing. If these were of World War II vintage, they were memorials to events which had occurred only some 30 years earlier. Not only the victims' descendants but undoubtedly some eyewitnesses were still about. Studying these plaques, I was struck with the thought: "Herein lies one major difference between Europe and America."

Europe has experienced wars fought on its homeland several times; America has not had fighting forces of other countries on its own soil.

"On that score," someone said, "America and Japan are similar; maybe America is a big island nation, just like Japan!"

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

BRIEFS

CENSUS TEAM TO PRC--Tokyo May 27 KYODO--A governmental team will visit China next month to help that country prepare for the taking of a national census next year. The government decided Tuesday to dispatch the mission, led by Shiro Shimamura, director general of the Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, to China from June 3 in reply to a Chinese request for cooperation. During its stay in China until June 19, the mission will visit Shanghai and other cities besides Beijing and give advice on methods for taking of the census, use of electronic computers and compiling of statistics. China is expected to send a mission to Japan late in September also to study census-taking methods here. Japan is to take a census this autumn. China took a census in 1953 and 1964. It plans to use computers for the coming census to enable the compilation of detailed statistics.
[Text] [0W270305 Tokyo KYODO in English 0259 GMT 27 May 80]

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MILITARY

'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON JAPANESE MILITARY BUILDUP

OW120939 Tokyo JPS in English 0905 GMT 12 May 80

[Text] Tokyo May 12 JPS--AKAHATA on May 12 carried an editorial entitled "Does Japan Follow the Road to 'Military Reinforcement and Tax Increases'?" saying that this "will further increase the danger of Japan being involved in a war maneuvered by the U.S., and uproot the people's living more destructively." Excerpts of the editorial follow.

"Although it was expected, it is very serious that at the recent Japan-U.S. summit talks, Premier Ohira promised to attain the Defense Agency's 'intermediate estimates for defense buildup' by one year in advance, moves are now coming to the surface for a big increase in the military spending in the next fiscal budget, and for that matter to increase taxes, and to reduce the budget allotted for the people's living.

"The 'medium estimates for defense buildup' is a large rearmament plan to spend about 2.8 trillion yen, merely for the cost of weapons equipment, including new fighters and anti-submarine patrol planes, in five years from fiscal 1980 to 1984, reaching more than ten trillion yen, if the personnel costs are included.

"If this defense buildup plan is enforced in the situation of serious deficit financing of 33.5 percent of revenues are dependent on national bonds (in the fiscal 1980 budget), this will clearly spur the over issue of the national bonds, or result in the destructive situation in the national financing and the people's living by the introduction of a general excise and other new taxes.

"It is no exaggeration to say that the government's and LDP's position to take part in the dangerous U.S. policy of strength, and to recklessly run along the road to a military big power, is to force the nightmarish experience during the prewar and war days on to the people again.

"To speak of the Democratic Socialist Party, which advocates Japan's defense buildup stronger than the LDP, it should not be overlooked that the Komei

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Party has recently issued a tentative draft of outlines of a 'coalition government plan,' which advocates that one percent of the GNP should be allowed for the defense costs, assisting the government's and the LDP's program.

"We must also point out that the Socialist Party, which joined in the coalition government plan, will actually approve the road of Japan to military big power."

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MILITARY

JOURNALIST COMMENTS ON 'NATIONALISM', DEFENSE

Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 23 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Hiroyuki Kubo, SANKEI reporter]

[Text] Debate on Defense Waxes

Recently, in a certain bookstore on the Ginza in Tokyo, a corner was set aside for the "Thinking of the Japanese Military on Defense in the 80's." Lined up on display there are books expounding the theory of the Soviet threat which ask, "When will the Soviet Union attack"? Alongside these books are specialized military books such as "Basic Elements of Strategy" and "Introduction to Military Science," which are the kinds of books used as textbooks in basic leadership training in the Ground Self-Defense Force. There are a hundred books on display. The background for the current boom in things military is completely different from the situation a decade ago, when the literature of the old Japanese Army was the favorite reading of the "violent set."

Following the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States has been openly asking for an increased Japanese defense capability. There is no need to even mention the DSP, which is running as its officially sanctioned candidate for the Tokyo district in the coming Upper House elections Mr Hiromi Kurusu, who withdrew from the chairmanship of the Joint Staff Council over a statement on "extralegal deployment" of the Self-Defense Forces. The JSP and the Komeito, though they still have their differences, have, for the present, come to an "agreement" on the Self-Defense Forces and continuation of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. As if in anticipation of this situation, business people have been discussing building up defense strength and even removing the ban on arms exports and reviewing the enlistment system.

In February, the commander of the United States Forces in Japan proudly testified before the U.S. House Armed Service Committee: "The Japanese people's support for the Self-Defense Forces has now risen from the 1972 level of 73 percent to 86 percent." The pressure for joint action by Japan, the United States and Europe to contain the Soviet Union, and for the concept

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of the Self-Defense Force to "block the three straits," seems to be an attempt to incorporate Japan completely in the United States' new global strategy, whether Japan wants to be incorporated or not. The people of Japan are scarcely given any accurate information or calmly reasoned arguments on the extent of the Soviet threat against Japan, how can this be made compatible with Article 9 of the constitution, or how this relates to Japan's national interests.

Pressure To Abandon the "Omnidirectional Policy"

Even President Carter's request for cooperation on sanctions against Iran is reported to Japan as part of a package with the argument against Japan's free ride in security and with the dissatisfaction of U.S. public opinion over the problem of the imbalance in exports to the United States. We do not know the extent to which this is "created public opinion" because the U.S. presidential election is involved. We can only feel that there is a danger that only logic in the dimension of power politics will be developed in public, and the people of the country will be allowed to fall into the illusion that there is no option other than "to do what the United States says and to build up the Self-Defense Forces."

There were some people who insisted that in response to the U.S. demands, Japan could only press on with its "catch-up diplomacy" (commentator Hideo Matsuoka), watching to see what course the EC would take, and on 21 April Iran finally decided to suspend the loading of crude oil. It had seemed that the postwar conservative-bureaucratic method of handling the political situation might have been set on handling domestic politics by "re-viving" the peace constitution through "interpretation" by means of a series of faits-accomplis and by handling foreign affairs with a utilitarian "omnidirectional diplomacy," but the United States and the Third World are now pressing Japan for a "declaration of bankruptcy" on this policy. In the end, "as a more realistic option for purposes of its own defense," Japan may have to elect to accept the U.S. demands, expressed in such fine-sounding terms as "cooperation with the United States" and "equal partners."

In a speech in Kyoto on 15 April, Chairman Miyamoto of the JCP said, "We will resolutely oppose hegemonism and fight any aggression, whether the other party is the Soviet Union or the United States and China. This is the position of a true patriot." Perhaps the JCP got an early scent of the budding nationalism (patriotism) among the people of the nation. Nationalism has generally been regarded as a symbol of the establishment. However, Maurice Thorez, who led the anti-Nazi French People's United Front, has pointed out: "The left wing itself is truly the successor to the French revolutionary and patriotic tradition." ("Child of the People," by Thorez) Just as in his words, it is evident that Thorez took the initiative ahead of the French right wing, which had accepted Nazism, when he tried to make nationalism the central theme of the United Front. Perhaps Chairman Miyamoto is following this example in his "true patriot's statement."

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What Should Be Defended...

It was out of wariness as to the direction being taken by the JCP that the LDP, in its Executive Council meeting on the 18th, placed the defense issue among the points to be contested in the Upper House elections. However, as can be seen from the fact that the leadership of the LDP is grumbling that "It was a very serious policy failure to have had Mr Kurusu stolen away by the DSP," it could be that it will run to the most "rightwing line" on the question of "patriotism" and defense.

Of course, it is unthinkable that the 90 percent of the people whose thinking tends to the middle of the road will easily be swayed by the winds of nationalism from the left or right or by arguments for a defense buildup "for which the financial burden will clearly be shifted to the people of the nation" (Ministry of Finance).

It may be said that the "peace constitution has lost its meaning," and there may be criticism of "the free ride on the Security Treaty," but these people have expressed their satisfaction with the "distribution of benefits" through real "economic prosperity," and they ask that this be continued. It would not do, however, to view lightly the Japanese characteristics of "banding together" in time of crisis.

It was, we believe, just before the 1970 Security Treaty that Yoshio Takeuchi censured the illusions of the movement to preserve the constitution by saying, "There is probably nothing so foolish as the attempt to build on a base of anti-war and pro-peace ideology in the absence of nationalism in postwar democracy." In the first place, nationalism should not be regarded as a taboo; "nationalism and internationalism and democracy and so forth, which are not directly related," have to be "abstract" (Mr Isamu Kono). Still, nationalism is at the same time a way of drawing the people toward a narrow nationalism and reconstructionism.

The most important thing at this point is for the government and a few politicians and bureaucrats not to monopolize information and decide what is in the "national interest" on the basis of that information, but for them to make known a broad range of information to the people and make every effort to include the views of the people. Japan cannot be defended merely by strengthening the Self-Defense Forces. Within the LDP there is hardly a remnant of the idea that "Japan's peace constitution basically presumes resistance by the people of the nation" (former Prime Minister Miki). We probably need to have an opportunity to reflect calmly on just what Japan's peace constitution is and on what it is that "the citizens truly should defend."

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'JAPAN TIMES' URGES HONEST, NONPARTISAN DEFENSE DEBATE

OW200143 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 18 May 80 p 12

[Editorial: "Honest Defense Debate Needed"]

[Text] The second Ohira cabinet has now been reduced by the dramatic events of last Friday night in the lower house to a mere caretaker government to sit through the general election coming late next month. But Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, the single member of the cabinet without a seat in the Parliament, made a needed contribution to the debate on Japan's defense when he made a series of comments that sounded oddly ingenuous, in the course of last week. The foreign minister attended meetings with top U.S. leaders including President Jimmy Carter when he accompanied Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira to Washington at the beginning of May.

In the exclusive interview with THE JAPAN TIMES he gave on Monday, for instance, Mr. Okita said the government would increase the defense spending "possibly as much as the U.S. requested" and that Japan "would achieve its five-year defense buildup program one year ahead of schedule."

He repeated the same statements when he held a no-attribution briefing with the vernacular press later on the same day. There he even said that it was necessary to augment defense capacity in order to implement "self-reliant" foreign policy.

These statements are believed to have been designed to give collateral support to the government's policy to augment the defense appropriations in the preparation of the 1981 budget. And they appeared to be the direct outcome of the recent Washington parley.

In any event, it is rather unusual for a high foreign minister official to be urging an increase in defense spending because the Foreign Ministry has tended to, if anything, restrain the Defense Agency in the latter's attempt at augmenting the defense budget.

And Foreign Minister Okita carried his message to the Diet when he addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councillors on Tuesday.

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There he sounded even more like a defense planner than a foreign minister. Reiterating his earlier remarks to the effect that increased defense spending was necessary for Japan's "self-reliant" foreign policy, he said: "If we depended totally on another country for our own defense, we could not carry out our own self-reliant foreign policy."

With this statement as a preface, Mr. Okita told the Diet committee that the radar sites of the self-defense forces were undefended and that the fleet of the maritime self-defense force was totally vulnerable to aerial attacks.

These facts raised, he said, a serious question as to whether the tax money was being properly spent. "Even though we may build radar sites and ships, would they not mean a waste of tax money if they were not properly defended?" he asked.

Mr. Okita went further, saying it was a matter of priority in public finance. "Public works budget totals 7 percent of the GNP while the defense budget is only 0.9 percent," he said. "The choice is whether or not to reallocate a small portion of the funds for improving roads and public facilities to urgent qualitative improvements in defense."

When he addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on Thursday, the foreign minister introduced a highly valid defense concept, which was perhaps never advocated before by a cabinet member. He said that Japan's defense capability should be such as to make any potential aggressor realize that it is too costly to invade Japan. Defense in that sense, Mr. Okita said, "is like an insurance" for the country that is defended. In other words, for a country like Japan, defense does not need to be 100 percent secure. But the perception it provides to a potential attacker that to invade Japan would not be worth the cost would prove a deterrent.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Ohira has not been as articulate concerning defense issues as he reported to the Diet on his recent overseas tour. Asked if President Carter made a specific demand that Japan strengthen its defensive capacity earlier than schedule, Ohira denied there was such a request and said Japan's response in this regard was only "general."

Obviously, Mr. Ohira was attempting to tone down the impression of the reports from Washington on the meeting he had with Mr. Carter. But his ambiguousness merely reflected politics. He had to play politics. Knowing the sensitivity of the Japanese public to defense-related questions. Thus, he left a definite impression of a gap between himself and his foreign minister concerning Japan's defense buildup effort vis-a-vis the U.S.

Mr. Okita has been outspoken, however, only because he is not a politician. He is the first foreign minister without a Diet seat in 13 years--since Mr. Aichiro Fujiyama was appointed to the foreign portfolio in the first Kishi

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cabinet in July 1957 though he successfully ran for the House of Representatives in the following year.

Mr. Okita is privileged to be able to speak with more honesty than if he were a Dietman even though such pronouncements may embarrass his political colleagues in the cabinet. But what he needs is a debate--be it on defense or welfare--that is honest in the sense that it is not clouded by partisan considerations.

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